Should the United States Change Its Policies Toward Taiwan?-Achieving a Difficult Balance
Rorry Daniels
The United States has never had a static Taiwan policy but always ebbed and flowed with shifting dynamics between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. After switching recognition from Taipei to Beijing in the late 1970s, U.S. policy toward Taiwan has been shaped by U.S.-China communiques, congressional acts, and executive branch statements and codified by “transit” visits of key Taiwan leaders to the United States, a growing list of arms sales, and even sending the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet toward the Taiwan Strait during the 1990’s missile crisis. Taiwan policy is best seen as an ongoing process underpinned by the United States’ de facto neutrality—namely, the United States takes no position on the sovereignty of Taiwan but wants to see the issue resolved without the use of force or coercion.
This political ambiguity has allowed a stable status quo in the Taiwan Strait—one of no unification, no independence, and no use of force—and enabled Taiwan to exercise considerable autonomy from Beijing despite Taipei having very few formal diplomatic allies. It has been one of the most successfully durable and flexible U.S. foreign policies in the modern era and it is still the best hope to forestall global catastrophe arising from a conflict over Taiwan.
U.S. de facto neutrality on the settlement of Taiwan’s sovereignty has accomplished two things: first, it leaves open the door for the sovereignty issue to be resolved in either side’s favor, therefore allowing all capitals to kick the can down the road until circumstances most favor their preferred resolution; second and relatedly, it keeps Taiwan’s status in the realm of a political, rather than a military, dispute.
It remains in the U.S. interest to support Taiwan’s thriving democratic system and its political autonomy from Beijing—as well as to forestall or reduce the risk of conflict in and around Taiwan. This is a difficult balance to achieve. Too much unilateral support for Taiwan increases the risk of conflict, and too little erodes Taiwan’s ability to exercise autonomy.
This balance is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain as the Chinese Communist Party modernizes its military and continuously emphasizes the imperative to resolve the Taiwan issue by mid-century. The question for the United States becomes, how can it remain neutral on the overall question of Taiwan’s sovereignty while still pushing back against the PRC’s use of coercion and implied threat of force against Taiwan?
The more Washington leans into a preference for Taiwan independence, the more the threat of force against Taiwan increases. As the United States erodes its neutrality with policy changes, it hardens views in Beijing that there is no hope for a political settlement and that the PRC must rely on military means to achieve its Taiwan goals.
Such policy changes in recent years have been numerous. A non-exhaustive list includes:
Language shifts in regular policy statements that replace support for an outcome acceptable to both sides of the Strait with an outcome acceptable to (only) the people of Taiwan.
The declassification in 2020 of the Six Assurances the United States privately provided to Taiwan in the 1980s, which declared no U.S. commitment to stop arms sales at a specific date after agreeing in the third U.S.-China communique to reduce such sales.
Sloppy references to Taiwan as a “country” in national security policy documents and State Department fact sheets.
Deletion and reinsertion of language on the State Department website on not supporting Taiwan’s independence.
The liberalization of the State Department’s Taiwan guidelines governing how officials engage in the unofficial relationship, including allowing officials from both sides to meet at government buildings.
Very high-level political visits to Taipei, such as that of former U.S. Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi, who was third in the presidential line of succession at the time of the trip.
Supporters of the above policy moves tend to put military competition above all other considerations and see the political support as a necessary deterrence strategy. However, recasting Taiwan as a military problem with political dimensions, rather than a political problem with military dimensions, is a major mistake. It undermines all sides’ ability to handle the sovereignty issue, creating a path dependence toward conflict, by devaluing the effects of political maneuvering and changes.
A security dilemma has developed in the Taiwan Strait in which all sides see their own actions as defensive or deterrent in nature and see the other side’s actions as aggressive enough to warrant a response. Beijing builds up its military capabilities in ways it sees as preparatory defense against a Taiwan declaration of independence, Washington interprets the capabilities as intent to attack Taiwan and strengthens its support for Taipei in ways it sees as necessary defense (including the policy changes referenced above), Beijing reacts to those actions with its own “defensive measures,” and the cycle continues.
This cycle moves ever closer to the fundamental red lines on all sides: the PRC’s red line on independence and permanent separation, Taiwan’s red line on coerced or forced unification, and the U.S. red line on the outbreak of conflict. And the closer the three sides get to crossing each other’s red lines, the more likely that a single action sparks an uncontrollable escalation of conflict—one that is not in the national interests or the public appetite of Taiwan, the United States, and presumably even China.
Pushback is necessary but using U.S. force as a blunt instrument to confront the PRC’s military threat or use of coercion does little to support U.S. and Taiwan interests in peace and stability across the Strait. The optimal approach is not to attempt to meet these threats on Taiwan’s behalf through U.S. guarantees of military support or political showmanship but to help Taiwan prosper under threat by materially supporting Taiwan’s economic and social linkages around the world. In other words, the best defense is to diffuse the power of the threat by complicating the stakes of the conflict.
Successfully supporting Taiwan’s prosperity under threat includes using Taiwan’s economic autonomy to strengthen its resilience and to network its industries with partnerships around the world. Taiwan faces unique challenges as an island economy, particularly as one that has eschewed nuclear power in the wake of the Fukushima disaster. Helping Taiwan through international partnerships with its land, water, and power resilience will further embed other economies in the risk of cross-Strait conflict, raise international awareness about the PRC threat to Taiwan, buy the United States time to explore policy options in the event of a blockade, and prove that democracies can work together to manage shared challenges.
The more uncertain the conflict environment, the less confident Beijing will feel in launching a successful attack. The Taiwan issue’s importance for Beijing’s domestic political legitimacy is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it pushes Beijing toward policy responses, including threats of force or the use of coercion, to bolster and self-justify its position on Taiwan’s sovereignty. But on the other hand, no Chinese leader can risk a failed attempt to settle the sovereignty issue once and for all. Even a more risk-tolerant Xi Jinping is unlikely to shoot for the moon by launching an attack on Taiwan that is not guaranteed to succeed.
In short, the more international attention and support for stability across the Taiwan Strait, due to deepening linkages between today’s Taiwan and the international community, the higher the cost to China for breaking the peace.
This approach may not be satisfying to those who see the Taiwan issue as a mere facet of the U.S.-China great game, or whose exclusive interest is American military advantage. But it does support U.S. interests in regional peace and prosperity, as well as what polls show the majority of Taiwan people want—a durable status quo, officials who can solve economic problems at home, and the continuation of Taiwan’s autonomy and dignity as a self-organized and self-governing body politic.